

Preparing for a DDoS Attack

Ronan Mullally, Akamai Technologies NANOG 67, Chicago, 14th June 2016

The Cloud...



What is a DDoS?



Where's your Umbrella?





Have a Plan

- Know what your options are
- Find out what upstreams can do to help and know how to use it
- Consider AUPs yours and your upstreams

Be nimble

- Low DNS TTLs on likely targets
- Put likely targets on independently routable prefixes
- Be able to quickly adapt your routing

2 - Be aware

Monitor everything

- Bit rate and packet rate via SNMP
- Netflow, Sflow, etc
- Peering portal stats
- Span ports / Taps

Know what's going on on your network

• Otherwise you're in the dark

Know what's going on downstream

- Your customer might *want* to see 43Gbps of NTP
- Or they might only want 80/tcp.

3 - Have a Robust DNS Infrastructure

If you (or your customer's) DNS is broken, so are you.

Don't make it an easy target:

;; ANSWER SECTION	:			
example.com.	14400	IN	NS	ns1.example.com.
example.com.	14400	IN	NS	ns2.example.com.
;; ADDITIONAL SEC ns1.example.com. ns2.example.com.	TION: 14400 14400	IN IN	A A	a.b.c.10 a.b.c.140

;; ANSWER SECTION:

a8-66.akam.net.

a9-66.akam.net.

all-66.akam.net.

a12-66.akam.net.

akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a20-	66.ak	am.net.			
akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a2-6	a2–66.akam.net.				
akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a3–66.akam.net.					
akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a9–66.akam.net.					
akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a8–66.akam.net.					
akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a5–66.akam.net.					
akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a11–66.akam.net.					
akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a13–66.akam.net.					
akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a1–66.akam.net.					
akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a16–66.akam.net.					
akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a28–66.akam.net.					
akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a12–66.akam.net.					
akamai.com.	300	IN	NS	a7-66.akam.net.					
;; ADDITIONAL SECT	том•								
a1-66.akam.net.	1011.	9000	10	IN	А	193.108.91.66			
al-66.akam.net.		9000		IN		2600:1401:2::42			
a2-66.akam.net.		9000		IN	A	95.100.174.66			
a3-66.akam.net.		9000		IN	A	96.7.49.66			
a5-66.akam.net.		9000		IN	A	95.100.168.66			
a7-66.akam.net.		9000			A	23.61.199.66			
a8–66.akam.net.		9000	90	IN	Α	2.16.40.66			

90000

90000

90000

90000

ΙN

IN

IN

Α

А

AAAA 2600:1403:a::42

IN ©20A⁵ AKAM184 FA26F160 W660™

184.85.248.66

84.53.139.66

4 - A Firewall Will Not Save You

State Kills The vast number of flows involved in a DDoS

attack can easily overwhelm a stateful firewall

5 - Spread the pain

Have multiple paths over which traffic can arrive

A broader 'attack surface' gives you more options

You can apply different measures on different paths





The ISP View



The Customer View



7 - Mitigation Appliances

Many vendors offer on-premises appliances

- Typically fixed N Gbps of capacity
- Some come with 'cloud' capabilities to use resources upstream

They will help defeat some attacks, but:

- They can be expensive
- You still need big pipes to ingest the traffic
- Not every attack vector will suit every device
- You need a human element to drive effective mitigation
- and...



The N+1th Gbps is a killer



Some day you're going to need a bigger boat

9 - Use Somebody Else's



There are options to mitigate attacks before they reach your network

Upstream providers may offer a mitigation service, or...

10 - Pass the Buck

There are third-party alternatives:

Content Distribution Networks

- Push content out to a vast server footprint
- Primarily an end-user-experience / performance service
- But can also absorb DDoS attacks
- They do not suit all types of (legitimate) traffic

DDoS Protection Services

- Have connectivity and mitigation capacity to absorb large attacks
- They pass 'clean' or 'post mitigation' traffic back to you
- via proxy or a direct link (real or tunnelled)



- Be Prepared
- Be Nimble
- Be Aware
- Have Solid DNS
- Don't rely on state
- Know what your limits are
- Consider third party services